Eskom is a massive problem for Ramaphosa, and the ANC, come 2024

Electricity is essential in modern society – and critical in keeping the economy running. As such, the country’s ongoing and relentless load shedding is a major crisis for the ANC as the ruling party.

However, this situation was set in motion relatively early in the ANC’s incumbency in the democratic dispensation.

This is why for example the recent criticism of Eskom by a former president (Thabo Mbeki) – who during his tenure ignored warnings about the potential for Eskom to descend into its current chaos – is taken with a pinch of salt.

One can even ascribe the current crisis to leadership not heeding counsel at the time. Were the opposite true, the government, through Eskom at that time, would have taken several steps to ensure that (i) power supply meets growing demands, (ii) ageing infrastructure is serviced while new infrastructure is built, and (iii) a committee of experts was appointed to conduct medium- and long-term assessments on the possibility of energy policy and corresponding institutions that would govern power production in South Africa.

Instead, the country is now experiencing action by an ANC that is trying to fix Eskom and, by default, solve the electricity challenge through crisis management.

To a large extent, of all the state-owned entities, Eskom’s crisis lays bare one of the significant weaknesses of the ANC-led government: letting a problem become a crisis to the point where it is no longer practical to live with it.

For example, the government’s decision to procure 1 000MW from independent power producers (IPPs) is in itself a reaction to the constrained power grid and failure to build new power stations.

What does this tell us about government action that can be described as a ‘strong-arm politics’ over reality?

South Africa has a government struggling with political will and interests to decide on an area where it controls the spending – energy.

Subsequently, on the one hand, vested interests and political conditions dictate responses to the electricity power supply shortage, as evident in the decision to buy energy from IPPs as part of the government’s additional megawatt programme.

On the other hand, in the absence of a clear energy policy-making structure, the electricity supply crisis must also be understood as forcibly removing politics from the decision to procure additional energy. For example, shortly after Stage 6 load shedding occurred, the preferred bidders were announced.

The decision can be interpreted as a government being forced to react to the situation.

The crisis management mode associated with the power utility and its daily operations raises an essential question related to the desirability and lack of political will to solve it.

Another question that must be answered is: if public policy so dramatically affects the form and function of reliable electricity production, who stands to benefit from the continued load shedding and crisis at Eskom?

If your answer is the ANC, you would be incorrect.

Remember, the party is currently wrangling internal turmoil over leadership, with a crucial national election ahead in 2024. Additionally, most of the senior leaders in this administration were part of the Eskom war room established by former president Jacob Zuma. The incumbent was tasked with overseeing that set-up.

The ANC is hard-headed if it does not acknowledge or recognise that the load-shedding issue will affect the elections.

Unemployment is skyrocketing, socio-economic problems are compounding, and young voters are fed up with empty promises of a better life.

The recent Stage 6 load shedding is undoubtedly a critical juncture for the country and government.

Unless the government produces a comprehensive national energy strategy to secure the future, it will always be in crisis management mode. For the ANC, the electricity crisis will play a decisive role in the 2024 national elections.

And at the moment, things are not looking good.